

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
HIGH COURT MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS
NO. 2696 of 2006

IN THE MATTER OF the High Court Ordinance

and

IN THE MATTER OF an application for a
Norwich Pharmacal Order

BETWEEN

KENSINGTON INTERNATIONAL LIMITED Applicant

and

ICS SECRETARIES LIMITED Respondent

and

LONG BEACH LIMITED 1st Intervener

COTRADE ASIA LIMITED 2nd Intervener

HEMISPHERE VENTURES LIMITED 3rd Intervener


E. INVESTMENTS LIMITED 4th Intervener
(formerly known as Elenga Investments Limited)

PAN AFRICA CONSULTANCY LIMITED 5th Intervener

JEAN-YVES OLLIVIER 6th Intervener

AFFIDAVIT OF JEAN-YVES OLLIVIER

I, JEAN-YVES OLLIVIER of 2 Streulistrasse, ZURICH, 8032, Switzerland, a
citizen of the Republic of France, make oath and say as follows:-




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
1. I am the 6th Intervener herein. I swear this affidavit in my personal capacity and on behalf of the 5th Intervener, Pan Africa Consultancy Limited ("**Pan Africa**"), in opposition to the Applicant's application for a Norwich Pharmacal Order against the Respondent.
2. The contents of this affidavit are true and based on my own personal knowledge and the documents in my possession or, if not based on my personal knowledge, are true to the best of my information and belief. Where true to the best of my information and belief, I identify the source of my information in this affidavit.

Personal Background

3. I am an international commodities and finance broker and consultant for projects, primarily with dealings in and throughout Africa, including African oil. I have been so engaged for over 40 years. I do not and never have held any official position in any government, African or otherwise, nor the Congolese government nor in any Congolese or other governmental or quasi-governmental owned or controlled organisations or companies, other than holding the position of Honourary Consul of Mozambique in Congo Brazzaville.
4. It is a well-known fact, in the public domain, that I have occasionally acted as a broker or consultant for Societe Nationale des Petroles du Congo ("**SNPC**") or parties dealing with SNPC as well as other commercial entities. I have also acted as a consultant for SNPC to develop international relations. SNPC is the State Oil Company, established by Congolese legislation to undertake the exploitation of Congo's oil reserves on behalf of the Congo, to hold Congo's oil related assets and to represent the Congo in oil related matters. SNPC sells crude oil for the Republic of Congo.
5. I have been engaged in the sale and purchase of commodities since 1965. I am well known throughout Africa because of my business dealings.



6. I also hold a number of honorary positions within Africa such as being the Honourary Consul of Mozambique in Congo Brazzaville.
7. I have never been employed by any government nor am I a "former French Intelligence Agent" nor agent or former agent for any other government or country.
8. I regularly visit Congo Brazzaville and Congo Kinshasa, where I have residences. My first visit to Brazzaville was in 1969 and I have since then done business throughout Africa. I am, therefore, well placed to advise foreign businesses and African governments on doing business and development projects in Africa.
9. I have met and have become friends with many heads of state and prominent African dignitaries. These dignitaries include President Sassou-Nguesso, the current President of the Republic of Congo, whom I have known since 1974.
10. I have also been honoured by many African Heads of State and the French Government and have been awarded many honours, including the following: 'Chevalier de la Légion d'Honneur et Chevalier dans l'Ordre National du Mérite in France Commandeur de l'Ordre du Mérite Congolais in Congo and Officier de l'Ordre de l'Etoile d' Anjouan in the Comoros.
11. In 1995, Mr Nelson Mandela, the then President of the Republic of South Africa, personally honoured me by appointing me the Grand Officer Order of Good Hope. Now shown to me and marked "JYO-1" is a list of those persons awarded with the Order of Good Hope in 1995.
12. The Order of Good Hope is awarded by the Republic of South Africa to foreigners for promoting international relations and the interests of South Africa. "Grand Cross" (being Class 1 of the Order of Good Hope) is only available to Heads of State. For example, in 1995, Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II was awarded the Grand Cross. "Grand Officer" (being Class 2 of the Order of Good Hope) is usually awarded to the ambassadors of countries to South Africa. However, in certain




circumstances, an individual (that is, not in their capacity as a state representative) may be awarded the Order of Good Hope for particular services to the promotion of international relations in Africa. I was honoured to be so recognised by Mr Mandela and the Republic of South Africa.

13. My reputation as a respected businessman in Africa has, on many occasions, placed me in a position where I have been able to assist with matters such as the peace process in South Africa and the release of Mr Mandela. It was primarily for my role as a peace broker that I was awarded the Order of Good Hope, described above.
14. My role as peace broker has been recognised by many historians. Now shown to me and marked "JYO-2" is a copy of an article from the 1999 Summer Edition of "Politique Internationale" outlining some of my peace broking operations.

Background to Pan Africa

15. I am the sole beneficial owner of Pan Africa.
16. I purchased Pan Africa as a shell company from ICS Trust (Asia) Limited ("**ICS Trust**") in 2002. I was introduced to ICS Trust by a reputable banking group.
17. Pan Africa was purchased to be a corporate vehicle through which I could run my broking and consulting services. I elected to use a Hong Kong company because Hong Kong is a reputable jurisdiction (with companies registered in Hong Kong enjoying more credibility than companies registered in less transparent jurisdictions) and has favourable tax conditions.
18. After I purchased Pan Africa, I continued to use the services provided by ICS Secretaries Limited ("**ICS Secretaries**") as they provide company




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secretarial services and administration support and act as the registered office. To the best of my knowledge, ICS Secretaries is a long established company with a good reputation and which I believed I could trust with my affairs. This is particularly important and useful to me as such services are not readily available in the Congo and, as I travel because of my work, it would be difficult to perform these services myself. This is the extent of my and Pan Africa's dealings with ICS Secretaries.

19. Now shown to me and marked "JYO-3" is a copy of Pan Africa's annual return for 2006, which has been obtained from the records of the Hong Kong Companies Registry. It can be seen that ICS Trust is the presenter of the annual return and ICS Secretaries is the Corporate Secretary. Orient Investment Limited and Pacific Investments Limited are the shareholders, each holding one share. Each of these shareholders holds their respective share on trust for me. I believe that this is the manner in which ICS Trust sets up all of its shelf companies. Pan Africa is a reputable company and is regularly audited by International Chartered Accounting Firms.


Affidavit of Donald Steven Schwarzkopf

20. I have been provided with a copy of the Affidavit of Donald Steven Schwarzkopf sworn herein on 20 December 2006 (the "Affidavit") and the exhibit marked "DSS-3" to the Affidavit. I have read the exhibited articles in both their original French version (being my mother tongue) and in the English version provided. I have also been provided with a copy of the "Skeleton Argument of the Applicant" dated 22 December 2006 and a copy of the Order of Deputy Judge Carlson dated 27 December 2006.
21. I have not seen a copy of Mr Schwazkopf's affidavit filed in HCMP 2261 of 2006, to which Mr Schwarzkopf refers in paragraph 2 of the Affidavit, nor have I seen any of the documents or affidavits referred to in paragraph 3 of the Affidavit. I am, therefore, not aware of the documents




referred to *"to establish the background"* or the *"relevant facts giving rise to Kensington's entitlement to seek a Norwich Pharmacal relief against ICS"*. I am also unaware of the events set out in paragraph 5 of the Affidavit. I have not seen the documents described as Exhibit **"DSS-1"**.

22. I also have no knowledge of the matters set out in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Affidavit. In particular (aside from what I can glean from the Affidavit), I have no knowledge of the incorporation details of Long Beach Limited (**"Long Beach"**) and E. Investments Limited (**"EIL"**), their beneficial or legal ownership or shareholding (nominal or otherwise). Indeed, prior to this application, I had never heard of either of these companies. I have not seen the documents described as Exhibit **"DSS-2"**.
23. I have no knowledge of the matters set out in paragraph 8 of the Affidavit. I do not know in what business Long Beach engages nor do I know in what business EIL engages.
24. I have no knowledge of the matters set out in paragraphs 9, 10 and/or 11 of the Affidavit. In particular I have no knowledge of Sphynx Bermuda Limited, Tacoma Trading Limited or X Oil International BVI or their respective activities.
25. I have no knowledge of the matters set out in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of the Affidavit nor can I comment on the postulations made regarding the matters contained therein.
26. I note that paragraphs 17 through 20 of the Affidavit draw conclusions about my dealing with ICS Trust, SNPC and the various interveners to this action. These conclusions are, it appears, entirely based on the various articles contained in Exhibit **"DSS-3"**. Where possible I will comment below on the particular conclusions, if relevant. However, as a general observation, I note that the majority of the negative articles are out of date and are taken from African internet publications, the accuracy and reliability of which is always questionable. (I also note that the Applicant has not provided any positive articles about me). The articles contain considerable speculation on the part of the various authors.




These conclusions are further speculated and extrapolated by Mr Schwarzkopf. Those familiar with Africa will be aware that the media is often used as a vehicle to achieve political means and is capable of being subject to manipulation. I do not consider the various articles exhibited to be reliable sources of information and I do not consider the findings or opinions of the authors to be authoritative. In fact, such opinions are generally unreliable and politically motivated.

27. As but one example of the unreliability of articles of this type, I refer to the article appearing at pages 7 to 9 of Exhibit "DSS-3". This particular article accuses me of having been "*a key sanctions buster for apartheid South Africa*". The accusation implies that I supported the apartheid South African government by trading with it contrary to international sanctions, thereby sustaining the apartheid regime for longer than otherwise might have been the case. The allegation is untrue. In the very same article, the author notes that I was presented the Order of Good Hope by Mr Mandela, (which I have explained in paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 above) shortly after the fall of the apartheid South African Government. Given the nature of the relationship between Mr Mandela and his democratic South African Government with the apartheid South African Government it replaced, it is highly unlikely that Mr Mandela would award me the Order of Good Hope on behalf of the post-apartheid Republic of South Africa if the allegation was even possibly true. Any publication that would print an article such as this must be questioned for its accuracy.
28. Paragraph 18 of the Affidavit states that I am a "*former French Intelligence agent*". I repeat paragraph 7 above. If I understand paragraph 2 of the Affidavit correctly, Mr Schwarzkopf is saying that this statement is known by him to be true, based on his personal knowledge. I question how Mr Schwarzkopf can depose to having this knowledge when the statement is entirely false.
29. Paragraph 18 of the Affidavit further claims that I am described in "*numerous articles*" as:




- a. A close personal friend of and supporter of President Sassou-Nguesso; and
- b. A 'protector' of Congo's oil interests from the claims of judgment creditors.
30. The articles relied upon for these claims are listed as being at pages 2, 26 and 31 of Exhibit "DSS-3" to the Affidavit. I have read the articles upon which the above claims are said to be based. I do not understand what it means to be "a supporter of" President Sassou-Nguesso. I have known President Sassou-Nguesso since 1974. I consider myself to be a friend of President Sassou-Nguesso (to the extent that one can claim to be a "friend" of a Head of State). By the same measure I also include among "my friends" President Mr Nelson Mandela, Mr Tokyo Sexwale, President Joaquim Chissano, President dos Santos, President Museveni President Omar Bongo, President Konan Bédié and many others. These friendships are well documented.
31. There are no articles provided by the Applicant that suggest that I provide protection to SNPC from judgment creditors. The article at page 26 of Exhibit "DSS-3" says "*SERELCO thus provides some small "protection" to the SNPC which has been besieged in France by the Republic of Congo's creditors*". The meaning is clearly that Serelco has given SNPC a place to work, which is not currently besieged by creditors, and this is the extent of the "protection". The article does not in any way suggest that Serelco is a "protector" by interfering with the ability of judgment creditors to pursue claims. The article certainly does not say that I am performing the role alleged by Mr Schwarzkopf. I believe that Mr Schwarzkopf's statements are a deliberate misreading and embroidering of the article to imply that I have personally attempted to prevent creditors of the Congo from being paid. In any event, the allegation is untrue. I believe that if Serelco was a "protector" of SNPC in the sense which Mr Schwarzkopf is implying, (i.e. Serelco was illegally preventing creditors from obtaining judgment against SNPC), the Applicant or other creditors would certainly have pursued legal actions against Serelco. To the best of my knowledge and belief, no



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
legal action of any kind has been taken against Serelco, nor against the management or shareholders of Serelco.

32. In paragraph 18 of the Affidavit, Mr Schwarzkopf also claims that Serelco was found by the bailiffs to have provided "*clandestine office facilities for SNPC*". Mr Schwarzkopf supports this claim by reliance on the article at page 41 and 42 of Exhibit "**DSS-3**". I have read that article in both French and English. I believe Mr Schwarzkopf's statement is again a deliberate misreading of the article. Nowhere in the article does it imply that there was anything secret or clandestine regarding the office services provided. The use of the word "clandestine" relates only to allegations in relation to oil sales. I have no connection with the allegations or those particular oil sales.
33. I would like to clarify the relationship between myself, Serelco and SNPC. I am a shareholder of Serelco. I am not a director and I do not take part in Serelco's day-to-day operations, which are managed independently of me. My shareholding in Serelco is a matter of public record, as is the fact that I am not a director. Serelco used to operate from Avenue de Friedland in Paris and was headquartered there. SNPC did rent office space at the Avenue de Friedland in Paris from Serelco, but not within Serelco's offices. The space rented by SNPC was on a different floor to Serelco's own offices. The extent of the relationship between Serelco and SNPC is, I believe, that which you would expect between a landlord and a tenant. There was nothing secretive about the arrangement between Serelco and SNPC.
34. Contrary to Mr Schwarzkopf's statement, SNPC's presence at Avenue de Friedland was not secret or "clandestine". A sign displaying the name 'SNPC' was easily visible to the public and there has been no attempt to conceal the fact that SNPC had offices or that it operated from there. Serelco certainly did not assist in concealing SNPC's presence, whether to provide 'protection' from judgement creditors or otherwise. In fact, the article relied upon by the Applicant and annexed at pages 41-42 of Exhibit "**DSS-3**" states that the bailiffs were able to attend and execute a garnishee order in the recovery of a judgment debt. I believe that the




reason the bailiff could execute the order against SNPC was because the office was not disguised as a Serelco office or secretly leased to SNPC. As to whether SNPC has properly registered its staff for tax purposes, that is a matter wholly unrelated to Serelco of which I have no knowledge.

35. It is also unremarkable that SNPC would ask Serelco to find it office space. As I will discuss in paragraph 37 below, I have previously acted as a broker for SNPC and was already known to them.
36. Paragraph 19 of the Affidavit raises certain transactions in which Pan Africa was involved and provides copies of invoices relating to these transactions. First, I do not know how the Applicant came to have copies of documents relating to Pan Africa's business and this raises certain questions in itself. Not surprisingly, I object to information disclosing my income and Pan Africa's bank accounts having been provided to the Applicant in the first place and then being released in an affidavit.
37. To the extent that Mr Schwarzkopf is questioning the *bona fides* of the transactions referred to in paragraph 19 of the Affidavit and the commission received, I make the following observations:
- (i) I have through Pan Africa been involved in organised oil-collateralised loans for SNPC. As stated in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, I am a finance and oil broker; as stated in paragraph 17 above, Pan Africa is the vehicle for my brokering activity. The activities are all above board and most of them have been reported in official financial publications such as the Financial Times, as the Applicant should know and should properly have disclosed to the Court when making its applications.
 - (ii) The invoices issued for the commission on the transactions are issued by Pan Africa and show ICS Trust as the address for Pan Africa. As stated in paragraph 18 above ICS Trust is the registered office of Pan Africa.
 - (iii) As can be seen from the article at page 26 of Exhibit "DSS-3", these types of loans involve large sums of money, with many being



in the sums of hundreds of millions of US dollars. These types of loans also involve large reputable and internationally renowned banks such as BNP Paribas, Standard Chartered Bank and RMB, (Rand Merchant Bank, South Africa's leading Investment Bank). As is obvious from the involvement of these banks these deals are above board. Further, as can be seen from the fact that they are reported in the press, they are not secret (aside from the usual confidentiality that attaches to commercial transactions of this nature).


- (iv) The payments received by Pan Africa from SNPC are commission payments that I had been paid for successfully negotiating these types of transactions (success fees), and which are customary in this type of contract. On their own, any such commission payments might be viewed as being very significant sums of money, but they had best be considered relative to the amounts of the loans involved. The commissions I have received are in fact 0.375% of the loan amount. Such commission is only awarded when a loan is successfully negotiated. I am not separately paid for my expenses and efforts over what might be months of negotiations. The expense element which I incur in broking such deals is usually significant as I will normally be required to attend many meetings with the banks (usually a syndicate rather than a single bank) and would therefore have to engage in extensive international travel. In the oil broking industry, a commission of 0.375% payable on success only and exclusive of expenses is well within the normal range. In respect of any deals that I was not able to successfully negotiate on behalf of SNPC or others, I would not be paid commission and would also have to pay for all the expenditure incurred in the process out of my own pocket.
- (v) I note that the invoices direct that the payment be made into a Hong Kong bank account of Standard Chartered. Before accepting such sums, I understand that Standard Chartered would have to satisfy itself as to the source of those funds and in particular that they were derived from bona fide transactions. Further, it should be



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
noted that the payments were made into the account in the name of Pan Africa - there has been no attempt to hide or disguise the recipient or location of the funds paid.

38. As for paragraph 20 of the Affidavit, which states that Pan Africa has established relationships with both ICS and Congo, I have already explained in paragraphs 16-19 above Pan Africa's respective relationships with ICS. Pan Africa does not have a relationship with the Congo except and to the extent that Pan Africa is the vehicle that I use when providing broking and consulting services for transactions involving Congolese oil.
39. As regards paragraph 21(1) of the Affidavit, Mr Schwarzkopf claims there is a "demonstrably clear link" between ICS Trust and Long Beach, EIL, Itunde, BCL and Pan Africa. I agree that there is a link between ICS Trust and Pan Africa; I trust I have explained in sufficient detail above and have:
- (i) Explained how Pan Africa came to be connected with ICS Trust;
 - (ii) Explained why Pan Africa has ICS Trust's address as its registered office; and
 - (iii) Confirmed ICS Secretaries does provide company secretarial services to Pan Africa.
40. As for paragraph 21(2) of the Affidavit, I believe I have explained in sufficient detail above the purpose for which Pan Africa is used by me and that it is not a "Congolese-connected entity" as alleged by Mr Schwarzkopf. Furthermore, I would not be surprised if ICS Secretaries were unable to provide information relating to the assets, structure and purpose of Pan Africa or the services provided by it because the extent of ICS Secretaries' involvement in Pan Africa is simply to provide company secretarial services and administrative support.




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41. I have no knowledge of the matters set out in paragraph 21(3) of the Affidavit. In particular I have no knowledge of Cotrade Asia Limited ("**Cotrade Asia**") and Hemisphere Ventures Limited ("**HVL**").
42. As regards paragraph 21(4) of the Affidavit, and the allegation that Pan Africa is a part of a corporate structure "*created by Congolese officials in Hong Kong*", I do not agree. I have stated above how Pan Africa came into being and why it was created. Pan Africa is not part of any "*corporate structure*", Congolese or otherwise, nor was it a corporate structure created by Congolese officials as Mr Schwarzkopf alleges. As stated above, I purchased Pan Africa from ICS Trust for the purposes described in paragraph 17 above.
43. In regard to the documents sought in paragraph 22 of the Affidavit, I make the following comments:
- (i) In regard to paragraph 22(3), I see no reason why all instructions issued to ICS Secretaries by Pan Africa should be disclosed. Such an order would give the Applicant access to instructions to ICS Trust that relate to my personal affairs and which could not under any circumstances be relevant to the Applicant establishing a relationship with Pan Africa and any other entity, let alone those listed;
 - (ii) In regard to paragraph 22(4), I am the individual authorised to give directions to ICS Trust and ICS Secretaries, my details are provided at the beginning of this affidavit;
 - (iii) In regard to the ownership and corporate structure of Pan Africa, I have provided these details in this affidavit. There is no corporate connection between Pan Africa and any other company or individual.
 - (iv) There are no business transactions involving Long Beach, EIL, Itunde, BCL and Pan Africa.




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44. In regard to paragraph 23 of the Affidavit, I note that it is suggested in paragraph 7 of the Skeleton Argument of the Applicant (submitted to the Court for hearing of the Applicant's *ex parte* application on 27 December 2006) that I may be "a party to the conspiracy pleaded in HCA 2695 of 2006". I have not seen the Writ therein and so cannot comment with certainty, but I understand this "conspiracy" to be to deprive the Applicant of recovering its debts. I understand that the earliest of these judgment debts was obtained in December 2002. I cannot see how documents dated prior to the date of the earliest judgment can be relevant as they, as a matter of common sense, cannot relate to the conspiracy in which I am alleged to have participated.
45. For the avoidance of any doubt I wish to make clear that if any such "conspiracy" exists, I am not a party to it. I have not conspired in any way to prevent the Applicant from recovering its debts. I have set out above the details of my roles as a finance and oil broker, Honourary Consul and peace negotiator. All of these positions rely on my established reputation and integrity as a trustworthy person who acts in the interests of those I am assisting rather than in my own self-interest. I object to the Applicant making such baseless allegations against me where the Applicant is aware that I have little legal recourse for the damage done by the allegations, particularly as the allegations are based on such a paucity of evidence.
46. In light of the above, I fail to see the basis for this application for disclosure of the items listed in paragraph 22 of the Affidavit and which concern Pan Africa or myself. I object in principle to the Order being made (i.e. regardless of whether or not any documents held by ICS Secretaries fit within the scope of the Order) for the following reasons:
- (i) I do not believe that the Applicant has shown a "demonstrably clear link" between ICS Trust and Cotrade Asia, HVL, Long Beach, EIL, Itunde or BCL and Pan Africa.



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- (ii) I do not believe that the Applicant has demonstrated or could ever demonstrate that I am a “protector” of SNPC from creditors of the Congo.
- (iii) I do not believe that there is any evidence that I am part of a conspiracy of any kind and I deny conspiring in the manner alleged or at all. While I recognise that there may be circumstances where an individual’s privacy can be compromised, I believe that this should only occur when it is clearly necessary to do so. I can see no such necessity in this application, nor do I believe it to be so proven.
- (iv) I believe that Kensington’s *modus operandi* includes making unsupported and sensationalised allegations against any party with a connection to the Congo in the hope that they may inadvertently discover useful information through “fishing expeditions” of this nature. In the process of doing so, the Applicant knowingly and without compunction damages the reputations of a number of innocent people, like myself, by their allegations and puts those persons to considerable time and expense protecting their confidentiality and in having to resist the applications. I do not believe the conduct of the Applicant should be endorsed or assisted by the Courts.
- (v) I have already been put to considerable expense and inconvenience by the Applicant’s application, including travelling to Hong Kong to meet with my legal advisors. I am concerned that any documents produced by ICS Secretaries that relate to any of the various interveners will only result in a further round of spurious applications by the Applicant.
- (vi) I believe that if the Order sought is granted, the Applicant may then use the granting of the order sought herein to do yet further damage to my business and personal reputation by claiming that the allegations which the Applicant has made against me have been “confirmed” by the granting of the Order.



Handwritten signature or initials.

Sworn at JOHANNESBURG)
SOUTH AFRICA)

the 14 day of May 2007)



Before me,



BEFORE ME

JOHN EDWARD BROIDO
NOTARY PUBLIC
JOHANNESBURG
SOUTH AFRICA



HCMP 2696 of 2006

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
HIGH COURT MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS
NO. 2696 of 2006

IN THE MATTER OF the High Court
Ordinance

and

IN THE MATTER OF an application for a
Norwich Pharmacal Order

BETWEEN


KENSINGTON INTERNATIONAL LIMITED and	Applicant
ICS SECRETARIES LIMITED and	Respondent
LONG BEACH LIMITED	1 st Intervener
COTRADE ASIA LIMITED	2 nd Intervener
HEMISPHERE VENTURES LIMITED	3 rd Intervener
E. INVESTMENTS LIMITED (formerly known as Elenga Investments Limited)	4 th Intervener
PAN AFRICA CONSULTANCY LIMITED	5 th Intervener
JEAN-YVES OLLIVIER	6 th Intervener

AFFIDAVIT OF JEAN-YVES OLLIVIER

Filed on 16th May 2007.

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
HIGH COURT MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS
NO. 2969 of 2006

IN THE MATTER OF the High Court
Ordinance

and

IN THE MATTER OF an application for a
Norwich Pharmacal Order

BETWEEN

KENSINGTON INTERNATIONAL LIMITED Applicant

and

ICS SECRETARIES LIMITED Respondent

and

LONG BEACH LIMITED 1st Intervener

COTRADE ASIA LIMITED 2nd Intervener

HEMISPHERE VENTURES LIMITED 3rd Intervener

E. INVESTMENTS LIMITED 4th Intervener
(formerly known as Elenga Investments Limited)

PAN AFRICA CONSULTANCY LIMITED 5th Intervener


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AFFIDAVIT OF JEAN-YVES OLLIVIER


This is the exhibit marked "JYO-01" referred to in the Affidavit of Jean-Yves Ollivier dated the _____ day of May 2007.

<u>Description</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>No. of Page(s)</u>
Copy list of persons awarded with the Order of Good Hope in 1995.	--	1

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Solicitors for the 5th and 6th Intervener



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About government

- > Programme of Action
- > Government services
- > Contact Information
- > National Budget
- > Vacancies
- > National Symbols
- > National Orders
- > Elections
- > Government system
 - > National legislature (Parliament)
 - > Executive Authority (President, Cabinet and Deputy Ministers)
 - > Justice system
 - > National departments
 - > State institutions supporting constitutional democracy
 - > Traditional leadership
 - > Provincial government
 - > Local government
 - > Co-operative governance
 - > Public Administration
 - > Security services
 - > Finance

[Home] [About government] [National Orders]

1995 National Orders awards

The Order of Good Hope

Class I : Grand Cross

- President Kim Young Sam (Republic of Korea)
- President Z el A Ben Ali (Tunisia)
- His Majesty Emperor Akihito (Japan)
- President JA Chissano (Mozambique)
- King Mswati III (Swaziland)
- President MANL Soares (Portugal)
- Sheikh Khalifa Bin Hamad Al-Thani (State of Qatar)
- President AH Mwinyi (Tanzania)
- President CS Menem (Argentina)
- Sheikh Issa Salmon Hamad Al-Khalifa (State of Bahrain)
- Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II
- Shelkh Zayed Bin Sultan Al-Nahyan (United Arab Emirates)

Class II : Grand Officer

- Ambassador KYB Ekblom (Finland)
- Ambassador Stjernberger (Sweden)
- Ambassador PA Tsamoulis (Greece)
- Ambassador Moebius (Austria)
- Mr J-Y Ollivier (France)
- Ambassador R van Overberghe (Belgium)
- Ambassador H Porta (Argentina)
- Ambassador JML Ritto (Portugal)
- Ambassador Ueberschaer (Germany)


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
AFFIDAVIT OF JEAN-YVES OLLIVIER

This is the exhibit marked "JYO-02" referred to in the Affidavit of Jean-Yves Ollivier dated the _____ day of May 2007.

<u>Description</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>No. of Page(s)</u>
Copy of an article from the 1999 Summer Edition of <i>Politique Internationale</i> titled "Africa: A mediator behind the scene".	--	23

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
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AFRICA: A MEDIATOR BEHIND THE SCENE

interview with
Jean-Yves Ollivier



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
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Interview with Jean-Yves Ollivier*


AFRICA: A MEDIATOR BEHIND THE SCENE

*This interview was conducted by
Dominique Nasplèzes***

1988. A camp, somewhere in the Kalahari desert. Under major but discreet surveillance, under khaki canvas set up in the shade of acacia bushes, men are having a friendly lunch, drinking together on folding chairs. Hunters? Not exactly.... The guests are Roelof "Pik" Botha, the South African Foreign Affairs minister; Jean-Christophe Mitterrand, President Mitterrand's son and special adviser on African affairs; Jeanny Lorgeou, a Socialist parliamentarian; Jacinto Veloso, the Mozambican Minister of Cooperation; "Kito" Rodriguez, the Angolan Interior Minister; Desiderio da Costa, the Angolan Petroleum Minister; Mark Strauss, the son of Franz-Joseph Strauss; Dieter Holzer, close to the German intelligence services; and Neels Van Tonder, head of the South African military intelligence apparatus. They arrived via helicopter, truck or Land Cruiser for a three-day meeting which was to remain secret for more than ten years — until *Politique Internationale* revealed its existence.

* French businessman. National adviser on French foreign trade. Since 1970, Jean-Yves Ollivier has been at the head of several companies specializing in international business. Today, in Africa, he is especially involved in the areas of telecommunications, energy, fuel and mining.

** Journalist. Adviser to the President of the pan-African radio station "Africa No.1". As a producer of television programming, he has made over a hundred documentaries on Africa. He recently wrote the biographies of the South African ex-Prime Minister, Tokyo Sexwale, and the terrorist Carlos. He is currently writing a book on Osama bin Laden.



The man who organized this meeting was Jean-Yves Ollivier, a French businessman well known in South Africa, who wanted his guests to get to know and understand each other. On the agenda were informal conversations on the Angolan/South African war, on the political situation in South Africa, in Angola, in Mozambique and in the South-Western African colony which was, a few years later, to be known as Namibia.

Jean-Yves Ollivier was born in 1944 in Algeria. Since the '70s, his career in international trade has seen him criss-cross Africa. His multiple contacts have, over the years, allowed him to develop a "modus operandi" which is relatively unique in the world, closely linking the worlds of politics and business, a network similar to that established early in the century by British businessmen. Revealing thirty years of extremely discreet behind-the-scenes activity, this interview shows just how much Jean-Yves Ollivier's secret diplomacy has played a major role in Southern Africa since the wave of independence. It will reveal why the selective disengagement from Africa by Western powers, or their irresponsible engagement against African priorities, has led, today, to one of the pressing dangers to a worldwide equilibrium. Reading it, one is aware that meetings missed and chances lost have led Western diplomacy into an African maze where the paths of Washington and Paris diverge. Perhaps a means of reminding the West of the wisdom behind the saying "Forget the South, and you'll also lose some of the North"...


D.N.

Dominique Nasplèzes — *I'd like to go back to that time, eleven years ago, in the Kalahari. Why bring those particular people together when they would appear to be natural antagonists?*

Jean-Yves Ollivier — For exactly that reason... so that they could have the chance to talk about their countries without the pressure and the dogmas of their respective political systems. For three days we lunched together, dined together, slept in the same tents and, above all, we worked. They pondered over how best they could overcome their antagonisms. This informal meeting broke the ice and made it possible to prepare the future.

D. N. — *Why hadn't they met before? And why did they need you? You're neither South African nor Angolan...*

J.-Y. O. — Everything, almost everything, had dug a yawning gulf between them. So it had become impossible to communicate



calmly on subjects – which from their point of view – came down to a question of their own national security. The objective of this was to construct hypotheses to try to pull out of a whole series of crises and tensions: the absence of international recognition of South Africa because of Apartheid, the confrontation between Pretoria and Marxist Angola, and in the longer term, the end of the South African mandate over South-West Africa.


The fact is that, for numerous reasons, none of the participants had ever had the chance to speak freely face-to-face or in a small group with their political opponents because they were all bound up in the same straightjacket of their official positions. Don't forget that, at the time, the world was still divided in two and that the conflicts in this part of Africa were, above all, American-Soviet confrontations by proxy.

D. N. — *How did you convince them to accept your invitation?*
 J.-Y. O. — If I managed to bring them together, it was because I knew them all personally. They were already friends of mine. By joining forces and pooling our influence we became, in some way, "peace plotters", serving an ideal of peace and reconciliation. That meeting was the basis of long-standing cooperation.

D. N. — *What were the practical results of this secret meeting?*
 J.-Y. O. — Among others, a meeting between Frederik De Klerk and President Mitterrand in Paris in 1989. Against the advice of Roland Dumas, Laurent Fabius and Jacques Delors, with his son, Jean-Christophe, I convinced the French Head of state to receive the South African president. I also explained to him that the years to come were going to be decisive and that it would be a pity if France were not, in some way or another, to be part of the huge changes which were going to take place in southern Africa. He trusted me. Of course, the presence of his son in the Kalahari a few months earlier, and the impressions he brought back with him, counted for a lot. You have to remember as well that no French political leader had wanted to receive De Klerk during this first visit, apart from Jacques Chirac who was then Mayor of Paris. They all lacked foresight.

D. N. — *Was there anything in your background, your training, which predisposed you to organize this kind of international mediation?*

J.-Y. O. — No. Nothing had prepared me for getting involved in this kind of thing, certainly not at that level. Nothing in my pro-



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fessional background, I mean. But, in fact, everything, over the years, pushed me, clearly and irreversibly, in that direction. It's impossible to be involved in African affairs, at a certain level, without getting into contact with political leaders. And from that you naturally start to recognize their difficulties and aspirations. Sooner or later, because you're sometimes faced by extreme political situations — like that in South Africa at the time — even if no one asks for your opinion, you're tempted to give it just the same. That's the big difference with politicians or career diplomats like those I brought together in the Kalahari. I didn't have to hold back or respect any ideological line. For a free electron like me, the most utopian revolutions are possible.

D. N. — *What kind of background are you from?*


J.-Y. O. — Oh, very modest. My father was a mechanic and my family wasn't very rich. I was born in 1944 in Algiers. Maybe that explains my gut attraction for the African continent. But Algeria holds no special interest for me — for me the Maghreb is another world altogether. As from 1970, my career has been that of a self-made man in the sector of trade and oil. And totally independent.

D. N. — *What was the catalyst in your involvement, not actually in politics, but in serving diplomacy?*

J.-Y. O. — I caught the virus in 1987 with what the French press christened "the Albertini affair" and what the South Africans call "the Du Toit affair", the name of the South African officer captured in Cabinda (1) during a commando raid. Without going into details, these two affairs, which were actually only one, ended up with an exchange of Angolan and South African prisoners: the freeing of Albertini happened more by chance.

D. N. — *But this exchange of prisoners was exceptional enough. We were in the middle of the cold war.*

J.-Y. O. — True. The Angolans and the South Africans ended up talking to each other within the framework of a secret mediation handled from start to finish along with my two friends Jacinto Veloso (2) and Kito Rodriguez (3). I was convinced that dialogue was within reach but in order to smooth over the resentments on both sides there had to be a mediator who wouldn't talk in clichés and who would be trusted by everyone. As an independent businessman, close to both the Angolans and the South Africans among whom I had close friends, I was able to really help. This adventure ended up on the tarmac of Maputo airport, in the pure



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tradition of swapping prisoners in Berlin at the time of the Iron Curtain. Veloso and I had scribbled details of the exchange down on scraps of paper, from the transfer on the ground of the Angolan and South African groups down to the precise timing. Everything went off like clockwork, at dusk. It was very moving.


D. N. — *And afterwards?*

J.-Y. O. — The rest followed naturally. The same group of "plot-
ters", Rodriguez, Veloso and myself, we got together again not long afterwards and started talking about the war between Angola and South Africa — a state shunned by everyone among the international intelligentsia. The three of us tried to take the heat out of the debate and arrived at a simple conclusion but one which was very bothersome for the ex-colonial European powers, and for Washington and Moscow: the solution had to be African, and purely African.

To arbitrate this dispute which went much further than the countries concerned, we needed someone indomitable, who couldn't be bought and who was politically head and shoulders above the fray. I asked for an interview with the Congolese president, Denis Sassou Nguesso. I didn't know him but I was well aware of his firm stance on South Africa. He unreservedly agreed to help us even at the risk of upsetting public opinion at home which was very much against the "country of apartheid". The South African delegation, led by Pik Botha, the Foreign Affairs minister, and the Defense minister, Magnus Malan, finally set foot in Brazzaville... And so the "Quadripartite" meeting saw the light of day in Brazzaville in 1988 which was to lead to UN resolution 435, to Namibian independence, to the retreat of the Cuban expeditionary force from Angola and to the end of Apartheid with the legalization of the A.N.C. and its most symbolic consequence, the freeing of Nelson Mandela.

D. N. — *But didn't the Americans have something to say in all this?*

J.-Y. O. — They would have liked the negotiations held, under their patronage, in New York or Geneva, but we didn't let that happen. And it was in Brazzaville that the Angolans, South Africans, Cubans and Americans — the Portuguese and Soviets were observers — met. Naturally, they arrived in the Congo loaded with prejudices which we can barely imagine today: they came from different worlds and they were all on their guard. It was a real achievement to get them round the table even if they had



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
already begun to size each other up. Dialogue had been broken off for so long. And they'd always insulted each other during rare international meetings or in the press. We got them to speak their minds, not the usual clichés. It was decided that Namibian independence had to be a purely African matter and this principle was accepted. During the meetings I played my part as mutually accredited go-between. All the delegations used me to check the sincerity of the others or to pass on "off the record" message or to "test the waters" on new ideas. Finally, the last African colony was liberated in Africa, in Brazzaville. We all felt very proud to have helped sort out an African problem on African soil and above all, to have managed to control the whole process.

D. N. — *Have you been involved in settling other African problems?*

J.-Y. O. — At the same time, a number of African countries wanted to open a dialogue with South Africa which was a pariah in the eyes of world opinion. Their curiosity was limitless. Apart from all the propaganda — including that used by African Heads of States for internal consumption — the leaders really wanted to understand the real situation inside South Africa and its implications for the rest of the continent. The Mozambican president, Samora Machel, personally asked me to shed some light. This craving for information existed on the South African side as well: several generations of Afrikaner leaders had found themselves cut off from the rest of the continent on which they lived. So although there was no special problem to resolve, the situation itself was a major problem, an absurdity. Everyone was trying to demonize the other side as much as possible to justify an antagonism which I felt, in the middle of the 80s, was already beginning to fray at the edges and fossilize. I think I've contributed to bringing Africans of all persuasions together so that they could find together solutions to their problems.

D. N. — *How?*

J.-Y. O. — Quite simply by talking to them about what was going on "on the other side". Presidents Machel (of Mozambique) and Dos Santos (of Angola) understood why the South African system was carrying the seeds of its own failure, and not simply for moral reasons. Samora Machel, for example, misjudged the real role of the army: he miscalculated just how much Apartheid was costing the state and how much its hypothetical survival was mortgaging the chances of South African economic development.



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Month after month, the state was running out of breath. And the state had no choice: sooner or later, the system was going to have the end. I also passed on this message to President Houphouët Boigny; this is partly what encouraged him to half-open the door to "the country of Apartheid" as did later, with my participation, Presidents Biya of Cameroon, Bongo of Gabon, Mobutu in Zaïre, among others:


Those years also served to make the South African leaders understand that there were several ways out. The path of dishonour and humiliation – which would have speeded up the radicalization of the Whites – was not the only possibility. You have to remember that at this time there was only one person capable of saying to the South African government, "Surrender...we've won". And that was Nelson Mandela... In fact Mandela, used virtually those exact words to President P.W. Botha during a historic tête-à-tête meeting for which, for the first time and only for a few hours, he was allowed out of his prison in the Cape. It was important to prepare the pull-out from the Apartheid regime within the ranks of the white political leadership. Starting in the 80s, I devoted a lot of energy to that end.

D. N. — *Where did you get the mandate which allowed you to become involved in arbitration and mediation activities like the "Quadripartite" meeting in Brazzaville?*

J.-Y. O. — There is never any written mandate in this kind of situation. You might get a diplomatic passport but that's just administration. Whenever I mediate with a head of state, I don't need specific mission orders or credentials. On the contrary, it could be counter-productive! It would suggest that, without a mandate, I represent nothing. And it's exactly the other way round if a head of state entrusts me with a mission, it is because he's convinced that I'm outside the official circuit. On the other hand, believe me, the telephone is often red hot before any major interview! Don't forget that Africa is a continent of oral traditions. Most of the present African leaders respond to an informal verbal approach.

D. N. — *You're severely critical of conventional diplomacy...?*

J.-Y. O. — And with good reason! I blame the diplomats for never accepting or even considering alternative mediation. But, I've often worked closely, and exchanged information, with some exceptional ambassadors. But, to come back to the diplomacy in general, it is exactly because it is conventional and exclusive that it so often on the wrong track. Sometimes iconoclast methods




work best. The Kalahari meeting bore fruit because it was what it was — a get-together in the desert, without witnesses, with no written agenda, without any official notes being taken. It was a real African palaver, held in the sun under the acacia trees. The same meeting in the gilded salons of Versailles or on the Avenue Kléber in Paris would probably have been a fiasco at the taxpayers' expense, and those taking part wouldn't have talked to each other for long because each of them would have been forced to maintain his dogmatic position, including to the press. In the bush, we were free to conjure up all kinds of scenarios!

I think I also ought to say that, among my African friends, I find a sense of great disappointment in regard to French diplomacy. The Quai d'Orsay (Foreign Affairs ministry) imposes on them a form of dialogue which, in fact, isn't a dialogue at all but a monologue, carefully couched beforehand. And that's a relationship that is fundamentally foreign to Africans. French diplomacy imposes on them a standard written policy, a single hierarchical way of thinking which is handed down from the President of the republic to the most obscure chargé d'affaires. Everyone has to think the same way. But African leaders like to talk, they like the verbal world and colonization never erased that specificity. If they sometimes bend to Western diplomatic methods, it's out of courtesy and intelligence. Two qualities which, according to them, are often lacking in Western envoys....

D. N. — *How do you proceed, when you're in the thick of things?*

J.-Y. O. — When I'm in the thick of a mediation, I don't distribute any memos or declarations of intent in which every detail has been weighed to such a degree that it no longer makes any sense. I go where I have to, and I talk: I prepare the work by clearing the route.

Obviously I'm French, and my contribution which could be called "parallel diplomacy" is often looked at askance in certain Parisian circles when, in fact, it has no other objective than to assist peace and reconciliation. The same cannot be said for a certain counselor of President Chirac's whose African experience stretches no further than the Cocody district of Abidjan but who doesn't hesitate, out of ignorant pig-headedness, to drag France into all kinds of dubious adventures. I'm thinking of certain decisions in favor of this or that candidate or rebel who hasn't been elected democratically. I'm also thinking of partial or irrational analyses which led to support for people like Edem Kodjo in Togo,



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Bernard Kolélas in Congo and Abbas Djoussouf in the Comores. And the worst thing is that, in the eyes of Africans, these engagements are seen as being those of France...


D. N. — *How does a mediation or arbitration action begin?*

J.-Y. O. — It is rare for a Head of State to call and ask me to help sort out a problem. That's not the way it happens. Usually, I'm the one to offer my services. Or it happens by chance. For example, Tokyo Sexwale, who was Nelson Mandela's Prime Minister for the province of Johannesburg until 1997, and who can be considered the spiritual son of the South African president, one day introduced me to the Ugandan President Museveni as a possible link when states weren't talking to each other any more and when diplomatic means were leading nowhere.

Take the case of Congo-Brazzaville: the present situation seems inextricable. Well aware that it could never topple President Sassou Nguesso, the armed opposition attempted to strangle the country and prevent every attempt of stabilization. I consider that there's a duty to help there, because the Congolese are suffering... So, if some mediation between the political leaders, particularly with the young opposition cadres — including those living in exile in England, France or the United States — if that can create a climate of reconciliation in Congo-Brazzaville, then you've got to try! We know that we'll be backed by several African Heads of State. I believe that's the least Africa owes to Sassou Nguesso after the Brazzaville conference which restore its dignity to southern Africa.

D. N. — *Why does an African head of state allow himself to be convinced of the necessity of outside mediation when he has experienced diplomats at his disposal?*

J.-Y. O. — Because, all too often, he lacks neutral, detached information. I remember a mission on behalf of President Chissano of Mozambique in the middle of the 80s. He'd asked me to meet Alfonso Dhlakama the leader of Renamo who was then his most dangerous opponent. All he wanted was an "impression". I set off in perilous conditions and walked for three days through three different countries before meeting Dhlakama in the middle of nowhere. When I got back, I said to President Chissano, "Don't ask me how many divisions he has, I've no idea; but I think that he's a sincere and disinterested man". Another similar case, a few




months ago, I met Bernard Kolélas in the States where he'd settled after fleeing the Congo. He is one of the opponents to President Sassou Nguesso most favourable to an armed struggle to take power – and he does not hide it. It was a personal initiative, I wasn't working on anyone's behalf as you might think. No, I wanted to form my own impression of the man. And I did. Forgive me for not being able to say more: negotiations are still possible with him or certain of his supporters.

D. N. — *On a day-to-day basis, how do you handle this kind of political affair?*

J.-Y. O. — It's a question of agenda. You have to keep in permanent contact with the leading players and always be available. There is nothing more uncertain than an African agenda, but being totally available is the price you have to pay if things are going to advance. You also have to have done your groundwork, know how things are done, how your African partners think: they, for the most part, know Western thinking very well. You must never forget that most Senegalese leaders read *Le Monde*, *Libération* or *The International Herald Tribune* every day while – and I can say this without taking much of a risk – no equivalent French leader reads Senegal's *Le Soleil* or the South African *Star* every morning. Africans keep a close eye on what is going on in Europe, in France particularly. President Bongo, whom I know well, and whose political intelligence I especially appreciate, knows the electoral map of France better than most French politicians. I'd be curious to know how many French ministers or parliamentarians know the difference between a Punu and a Batéké or between a Lari and a Mbochi (4). Our African friends, who know and appreciate our culture, read us like an open book. But, most of the time, our Western leaders or diplomats – I'm not just talking about the French now – present themselves to African leaders as deaf, dumb and blind. Even if they don't know it. What is even worse is that certain of these French neo-colonialists turn this handicap into a sense of superiority. Sometimes my African friends tell me "You, you're a black trapped in a White skin!" I quite like that definition.

D. N. — *What risks do you run in this kind of parallel initiative?*

J.-Y. O. — I can't see any, unless it's being disowned if you fail. Which would be fair enough. No, thinking about it, there is another risk, being disowned if you succeed, but only by those who failed before, usually career diplomats or official advisers.




D. N. — *On the geopolitical map, what are the new challenges on the African continent?*

J.-Y. O. — Before thinking of the challenges of tomorrow, let's face the challenges of today: stability in the Great Lakes region and in the Horn of Africa. The Great Lakes region is a volcano. The Ugandan president, Yoweri Museveni, is often accused of wanting to set up a great Hima-Tutsi kingdom by favoring the ascent of new political leaders like Paul Kagame in Rwanda and Laurent-Désiré Kabila in the D.R.C. but this will for independence and nationalism from President Museveni's *ex-protégés* should be taken seriously by political analysts. This emancipation of Kabila and Kagame has a sense and will have wide effects... By becoming autonomous, the strongman of Kigali could be tempted to forge new alliances, with Savimbi for example and with all the risks of conflagration that would entail. The consequences would be extremely grave for Central Africa. We talk of this regularly with President Museveni and we're trying our best to establish contacts. I'm working on initiatives to this end by regularly meeting the top leadership of those countries involved in conflicts which affect Uganda. There are several rapprochements in the pipeline, some of them surprising.

D. N. — *Doesn't something have to be done to check UNITA which is, in your view, trying to cut Africa in two?*

J.-Y. O. — Jonas Savimbi leaves African Heads of State no choice: if you're not with him, you're against him! And he reaches his own conclusions. I know Savimbi very well and, as did many Western intellectuals, liked what he stood for at one time — when he was the symbol of the struggle in Africa against Marxist incursion. But, in September 1992, he committed a political error which will prove to be his downfall: he refused to accept the election results and took up arms again. If he had accepted the result of the ballot, if he had played the card of democratic alternation, perhaps he might have ended up succeeding Eduardo dos Santos. At this very moment, Jonas Savimbi could maybe have been president of Angola! But he didn't want to follow in the footsteps of previous rebels or freedom-fighters who did take the route without losing their dignity. If he has gone back to guerrilla warfare, I think it is only out of a thirst for power. From my point of view, Savimbi represented a great hope in the 80s but could not adapt to the end of the Communist world.



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D. N. — *But he still has the capacity to cause enormous harm....*


J.-Y. O. — One has to admit that he has not lost all his qualities: apart from his intelligence, Savimbi has an enormous strength of conviction and unique charisma. You need exceptional courage and long-term political vision to resist him and, above all, to resist his strategy which I would call a tug of war. Savimbi knows that by lining up the African countries friendly to him on one side of the rope and those that are hostile on the other, he forces each team to pull in the same direction, in the name of some uncertain common interest, which is sometimes even contradictory, and so manages to accentuate divisions. Certain African Heads of State have understood this Machiavellian manoeuvre. To stop him, the opposition team have to be unbalanced. And that has to be done before Savimbi sets the whole continent alight.

D. N. — *And concerning Sudan?*

J. -Y. O. — The situation in Sudan can be compared to that in South Africa during the 80s. By isolating a country, you don't know what is going on there, even when you think you're well informed... The best example is certainly that of the Al Shifa pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum that was uselessly bombed.

There are men in Sudan, worthy of trust and capable of succeeding where Mandela did: avoiding war and blood-bath and creating the conditions for reconciliation. President Al Bashir's team is gifted with a great capacity for adaptation and foresight. The Sudanese leaders — and I don't count the hard-line Islamists among them — have a real long-term political vision. The head of state listens to them and in Khartoum the "moderns" play a much more important role in running the country than the "ancients" or the retrograde Islamists. Al Bashir himself has accomplished quite an exploit: he has managed to install a federal state in this country which is the biggest on the African continent. Obviously, there is a long way to go before you can achieve the institutional perfection of the American system, for example, but the bases of federalism are in place — which no one else had the courage to initiate. Neither the English who always chose to "divide and rule" this country since the time of the condominium, nor the earlier Sudanese leaders who, from *coup d'état* to *coup d'état*, embarked on all kinds of political adventures: Marxism, Arab nationalism or plain dictatorship.

Certain dissidents in the south, such as Riek Machar — basically black, non-Arab-speaking Christians — are already prepared



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to undertake the normalization of relations between Khartoum and the south. The President lends them an attentive ear.

D. N. — *Rumour has it that Riek Machar could be a little too close to the president... You know them both: do you agree?*


J.-Y. O. — Riek Machar (5) was one of the most committed and prestigious commanders inside the rebel movement. After ten years of fighting in the maquis, he chose to work to establish peace. You'd have to be warped to blame him for that... He is backed by a great majority of people in the south and, contrary to what we are told, is not puppet of the government. That's just too easy! He is always being used to try to dishonour or discredit those who upset the short-term plans of the Western neo-colonialists. In Africa, particularly in Sudan, Riek Machar's mediation is much appreciated and is proving to be useful. It doesn't matter what London, Washington or the Vatican say. Western reactions are based on those of John Garang (6) the "last of the Mohicans" of the southern rebellion. Because he makes more noise than the others, John Garang gives the impression of being more representative than the six other factions which have given up the armed struggle in order to prepare for a referendum on the future of Southern-Sudan.

D. N. — *In spite of this evolution, Sudan — which shares borders with nine countries — remains, by its very nature, a hot spot on the African continent. To what extent are these neighbours affected?*

J.-Y. O. — It's always the famous domino theory! One thing is certain, Sudan has problems with the rebels in the south, some of them supported by Uganda. Obviously that doesn't help relations between Khartoum and Kampala. But there is certainly room for discussion there. Sudan has also suffered from the crisis in the D.R.C. It does not want to see his huge neighbour disintegrate in chaos, particularly since one element in the rebel forces is backed by Uganda. That deserves to be thought about... It's an illustration of the old principle "the friends of my friends are my friends and the enemies of my enemies are my friends". Just how far Africa is going to go along with that, nobody knows..

D. N. — *But, paradoxically, isn't Sudan on the right track, doing better than certain of its neighbours like Eritrea?*

J.-Y. O. — Eritrea, which is the youngest nation in Africa, has burnt its bridges with all its old friends, including those countries



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
which helped it on the path to independence in May 1993, notably Sudan. Today, it is surrounded by enemies: Khartoum, Addis Ababa and Saana. The only facade left is the Red Sea. Eritrean editorialists write with humour that the Red Sea is where its government will go drown itself when it runs out of enemies. A stable Sudan will be essential for peace in the Horn of Africa, in the same way a stable D.R.C. is crucial in Central Africa.

D. N. — *How can one escape from these repeated geopolitical crises which pile up one after the other?*

J.-Y. O. — In all the flash-points, above all you have to avoid breaking off dialogue before you get to the point of no return. I'm not sure conventional diplomacy is capable of that alone. Freelances like me will always be necessary to prevent conflict situations being worsened by prefabricated schemes which only take into account specific geographical criteria... Fields of conflict often spill across borders... Obsessed by the "politically correct" idea of non-interference, conventional diplomacy treats problems within the borders of a state — after that, since the problem is far away, let someone else sort it out! This is a double error: there can, in effect, only be global solutions and the reduction in fields of conflict can only reduce risks. Refusing to understand that political crises in Africa pile up like tracings which totally ignore borders is to refuse, for example, to admit that the war in the D.R.C. combines its vicious effects with those of the divide which is cutting Africa in two, between those who are pro-Savimbi and anti-Savimbi, and worsens the perverse results of cross-alliances which, as I said before, are often nonsensical. It is also to refuse to see that the support of Uganda, Zimbabwe, Sudan or the feeble support of South Africa, here and there, will finally weaken Africa as a whole. You don't treat cancer with iodine and a bandage. And today Africa is suffering from cancers which need radical treatment.

D. N. — *What is your analysis of the risk of regionalization of conflicts or antagonisms? Is it inherent to Africa?*

J.-Y. O. — It is more the result of the colonial legacy and the drawing of borders African countries inherited — this debate has been going on for hundred years — but changing those borders would cause even more problems. Once a conflict sets one part of Africa alight, it sends out shockwaves which almost inevitably reach their neighbours. The history of the African continent is ample proof of this. Apartheid in South Africa gave birth to the



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
RENAMO and UNITA resistance movements, or amplified them; the domestic crisis in the D.R.C. which sees President Kabila opposed by one, even several, rebellions, more often than not backed from outside the country, that crisis is now contaminating Angola and Rwanda, or it could be the other way round. The crisis in Eritrea is having repercussions in Sudan and Ethiopia. The current situation in Central Africa has set off a crisis spiral with its base in Kinshasa and which has progressively reached the confines of the continent, as far as the Cape and Tripoli where several heads of state are meeting to try and find a solution to the problems posed on Uganda's borders and across Africa in general. Globalization is not a theory, it's a reality.

D. N. — *In your opinion, why hasn't conventional diplomacy adapted to this kind of situation?*

J.-Y. O. — Because conventional diplomacy is a machine set up to serve the interests of the ex-colonial powers and because, in essence, its vision is not Pan-African. It's interesting to note that big businessmen like the English "Tiny" Rowland, founder of the Lonrho group — a multinational company with interests in Zimbabwe, Angola and Mozambique, among other countries — have a Pan-African point of view on the economy and, indirectly, on parallel diplomacy. And that in countries where classic diplomacy was, at best, inexistant or, at worst, had failed. The same thing applies to "Chief" Fernandez (7), a Nigerian based in New York, who has managed to set up business in southern Africa, Mozambique and Angola.

D. N. — *And you, what are you working on at the moment?*

J.-Y. O. — In the Democratic Republic of Congo, we've established, along with several leading Congolese personalities, ex-Mobutu supporters and dissidents, a "good offices" committee which was received early in April this year by the top state authorities and whose members have just returned to Kinshasa after months of exile. This committee, which I helped set up with the support of Presidents Bongo, Sassou Nguesso, Bedié, Museveni and Chissano, has been playing a major role for several months now in the D.R.C. It is an authentic Pan-African initiative which has won for itself the comprehension, or the support, of Presidents Mbeki of South Africa, Dos Santos of Angola, Chiluba of Zambia, Kagame of Rwanda, the Libyan leader Khadafi and, above all, of President Kabila. Being free to travel easily and carry messages, I was able to promote dialogue where it seemed inconceivable.



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And these contacts have left me with some unforgettable memories. I remember a recent mission to Central Africa which allowed me to put into contact two leaders, one English-speaking and the other francophone. During the first minutes of the meeting, they'd exhausted every possibility of direct communication: they tried French, English and Lingala (8) without success, each apologizing for not speaking the other's language. Suddenly, they exchanged a few words of greeting in Swahili. They laughed and afterwards everything worked marvelously. Moments like that are really rewarding and almost surrealist because they cock a snook at the neocolonialism surrounding us. Back to the committee I was telling you a few moments ago: it's the only political project of its type in the D.R.C. today. And this has not gone unnoticed by President Kabila or other leaders in the region.

D. N. — *What motivates you? And what reward do you get?*


J.-Y. O. — Reward? A feeling of osmosis with the way the continent is thinking, that I've got a mission to carry out, a duty to do. Which means that my reward is really a moral one. Plus the satisfaction of a certain success. By getting some prisoners freed (9), by contributing to liberate Namibia. By being part of the renaissance of southern Africa. By helping dissidents, bogged down in violence and armed insurrection, close ranks around certain idea of their country. That's motivation enough!

But you mustn't be naive either. I often say, "I've had enough of medals..." (10) The reward can also be the possibility of doing business in a country which has stabilized and is back on its way to being developed. This is what I do and numerous heads of state help by giving me the chance to invest in their countries.

In times of crisis, politics obviously overrides business; but in times of peace and growth, business takes pride of place. Anyway, the powers-that-be know where their interest lies. They know that a businessman is not locked into doctrine, and that business often opens up paths of non-partisan dialogue, efficiently, the results of which can be useful, even indispensable.

D. N. — *How do you finance your political activities? From your business activities?*

J.-Y. O. — Yes, but it costs a lot less than you might think! I work alone. I need to travel and use a phone. That's all!




D. N. — *Is it really possible to be a "free electron" of parallel diplomacy? What are your relations like with the French authorities?*

J.-Y. O. — That depends on who the president and the Prime Minister are... Between 1984 and 1988, I made certain that Jacques Chirac knew exactly what I was doing. Let's say that my political sympathies prompted me. But, very quickly, my activities became so obvious and at such a high level — beyond my wildest dreams — that I was soon in regular contact with those in charge of African affairs alongside Jacques Chirac, among others, Pierre Messmer, Fernand Wibeaux, Jacques Foccart and Michel Roussin.

In 1988, when the majority changed, we were in the middle of studying the dossier on Resolution 435 and the "Quadripartite" meeting. Quite logically, I found myself working with Jean-Christophe Mitterrand and Jeanny Lorgeou (11), at the suggestion of Jacques Foccart. The State had to be kept informed, that was the least we could do. In fact, we worked well together with Jean-Christophe Mitterrand on several dossiers: the Comores, South Africa, Angola. We had, along with other missions, contributed to preparing South Africa for the dismantling of Apartheid. The rest is still confidential.

D. N. — *And today?*

J.-Y. O. — Today, I don't ask for anything. And no one asks me for anything. I am French. I am not a "citizen of the world", and I make it a point of honour always to keep the French authorities informed of my activities. But I am also an African. The two are not incompatible in my eyes. And I don't have the slightest intention of compromising those notions which I believe to be essential: that the disengagement of Western countries should not be selective. It should not involve pulling out of what is costly in order to better harvest a profit... The African continent has a formidable potential but it is not at the disposal of neocolonialists, no matter who they are. On this subject, I willingly quote Tokyo Sexwale who often warns African political leaders: "When you see a South African investor in your country," he explains, "first of all ask him where the blacks are in his company. Ask who they are and what they represent just to be sure that they aren't "token blacks" appointed by white or Western companies as camouflage!" And, in politics, it's the same thing! Leaders should always ask themselves the same question: "How are our policies African and what is in our interest as Africans?"



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
D. N. — *If you had to, in a few words, sum up your hopes for Africa?*

J.-Y. O. — I'd say that it is more important to listen to what is being said in Pretoria, Abidjan or Dakar than Washington or Paris. Real freedom comes at this price. I use the word "freedom" on purpose. Certain Americans, like the Reverend Jesse Jackson, who are regular visitors to the Ile de Gorée in Sénégal (12), will know exactly what I mean and should respond. This is why my stance on the D.R.C., on UNITA, Sudan or Congo, seems to be going against the tide. But you hear the same thing all across Africa, in presidential palaces and in the street, even if you don't in Western diplomatic circles. We mentioned the "African Renaissance", a marvellous idea launched by South African president Thabo Mbeki. But one could go further. It's an "African awakening" you should be talking about in certain cases! A simple awakening...that of a continental nationalism which Africa sorely needs, faced by the constant pressures of globalization.

And finally, Africa has the right and the duty to make itself heard and respected. Conventional diplomacy, because it is unavoidable and essential, and because it is as established as the idea of a state itself, has the duty to help Africa.

In tandem, private mediation initiatives, like those I've been conducting over more than fifteen years, which are also quite as old as classic diplomacy states themselves, play a part which is perfectly complementary. Within the framework of this moral contract, it's pleasant to think that when I pull off one of these difficult enterprises, my success can also be seen as being that of France.

- (1) The Angolan enclave of Cabinda, rich in oil, is situated to the north of Angola from which it is separated by a slice of Congolese territory.
- (2) Then the Mozambican Minister of Cooperation.
- (3) Then the Angolan Interior Minister.
- (4) The Punus and the Batékés are two principal ethnic groups in Gabon, the Laris and the Mbochis are two Congolese ethnic groupings.
- (5) Rick Machar, ex-comrade in arms of John Garang, is, since 1997 the president of the Council for Consolidation of the southern states, an authority attempting to normalize and improve relations between the "Southern" and "Northern" Sudanese.
- (6) John Garang is the leader of the SPLA, a movement which claims independence for part of southern Sudan.
- (7) Antonio D. "Chief" Fernandez is a Nigerian businessman, resident in New York State. He has been chosen by Mozambique to represent it at the UN as Associate Ambassador.
- (8) A language common to both Congos.




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(9) The exchange of prisoners in Maputo on Sept. 27th, 1987 concerned 120 Angolan officers and men, a South African officer, Wynand du Toit and two volunteer workers, Albertini, French, and Klaas de Jong, Dutch.

(10) Jean-Yves Ollivier is, in France, *Chevalier de la Légion d'Honneur* and was awarded *the Ordre National du Mérite*. In South Africa, he is Grand Officer of the Order of Good hope; he was made, unique in South Africa, Commander of the Order by President P.W. Botha and raised to the rank of grand Officer by order of President Nelson Mandela. This rank is usually restricted to Heads of State or Government.

(11) Jeanny Lorgeou was, at this time, a parliamentarian and mayor of Romorantin. This socialist and *protégé* of François Mitterrand took the initiative of going to South Africa, then under embargo, on the occasion of Nelson Mandela's release from prison. The trip earned a reprimand from the Socialist party.

(12) The Senegalese island from which the slave convoys sailed to the New World.



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
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fernando henrique cardoso

brésil : un nouveau miracle ?

stéphane monclair

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alexandre lebed

russe : tant que le crime régnera...

adam michnik

la pologne : dix ans après

hamit bozarslan

ankara et le défi kurde

hacène belmessous

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jean-yves ollivier

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
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
HIGH COURT MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS
NO. 2969 of 2006

IN THE MATTER OF the High Court
Ordinance

and

IN THE MATTER OF an application for a
Norwich Pharmacal Order

BETWEEN

KENSINGTON INTERNATIONAL LIMITED	Applicant
and	
ICS SECRETARIES LIMITED	Respondent
and	
LONG BEACH LIMITED	1 st Intervener
COTRADE ASIA LIMITED	2 nd Intervener
HEMISPHERE VENTURES LIMITED	3 rd Intervener
E. INVESTMENTS LIMITED (formerly known as Elenga Investments Limited)	4 th Intervener
PAN AFRICA CONSULTANCY LIMITED	5 th Intervener
JEAN-YVES OLLIVIER	6 th Intervener

AFFIDAVIT OF JEAN-YVES OLLIVIER

This is the exhibit marked "JYO-03" referred to in the Affidavit of Jean-Yves Ollivier dated the _____ day of May 2007.

Description


Date

No. of Page(s)

Copy of Pan Africa's Annual Return for 2006.

8 March 2006

Kennedys
Solicitors for the 5th and 6th Interveners



A handwritten signature or mark, possibly a stylized 'S' or 'U', located at the bottom right of the page.



公司註冊處
Companies Registry

周年申報表
Annual Return

(公司條例第107(1)條)
(Companies Ordinance s. 107(1))

存案 Filed

表格
Form AR1

重要事項 Important Notes

- 填表前請參閱《填表須知》。
請用黑色墨水列印。
- Please read the accompanying notes before completing this form.
Please print in black ink.

公司編號 Company Number

788462

1 公司名稱 Company Name

PAN AFRICA CONSULTANCY LIMITED

(註 Note 8)

2 商業名稱 Business Name

N/A

3 公司類別 Type of Company

請在有關空格內加✓號 Please tick the relevant box



有股本的私人公司

Private Company having a share capital



其他

Others

4 本申報表日期 Date of this Return

本申報表列載公司截至右列日期為止的資料
The information in this Return is made up to

08	03	2006
HDD	MM	YYYY

(如屬有股本的私人公司，本申報表應列載截至公司成立為法團的周年日期的資料。如屬其他公司，所列載的資料則應截至公司周年大會日期或以代替周年大會的書面決議的日期為止。

For a private company having a share capital, the information in this Return should be made up to the anniversary of the date of incorporation. For other companies, the information should be made up to the date of the annual general meeting (AGM) or the date of written resolution passed in lieu of AGM.)

(註 Note 9)

5 註冊辦事處地址 Address of Registered Office

8th Floor Henley Building 5 Queen's Road Central Hong Kong

(註 Note 10)

6 電郵地址 E-mail Address

N/A

(註 Note 3)

提交人的資料 Presenter's Reference

姓名 Name: ICS TRUST (ASIA) LIMITED

地址 Address: 8th Floor Henley Building 5 Queen's Road
Central Hong Kong

電話 Tel: 2854 4544 傳真 Fax: 2543 5555


電郵地址 E-mail Address: N/A

編號 Reference: Our Ref.: EW/mg_Pan Africa

指明編號 2/2004 (修訂) (2004年2月)

Specification No. 2/2004 (Revision) (Feb. 2004)

請勿填寫本欄 For Official Use



EW/mg (Ar).Frm

5800

Handwritten signature and number 11

7 按揭及押記 Mortgages and Charges

截至本申報表日期，所有須根據《公司條例》第80及第82條規定向公司註冊處處長登記的按揭及押記的未償還總額

Total Amount outstanding as of the Date of this Return on all mortgages and charges which are required to be registered with the Registrar of Companies pursuant to sections 80 and 82 of the Companies Ordinance

(Nil)


(註Note 11) **8 無股本公司的成員數目 Number of Member(s) of a Company Not Having a Share Capital**
(有股本的公司必須填報此項 Company having a share capital need not complete this section)

截至本申報表日期的成員數目
Number of member(s) as at the Date of this Return

(註Note 12) **9 股本 Share Capital**
(無股本的公司必須填報第9及第10項 Company not having a share capital need not complete sections 9 & 10)

截至本申報表日期 As at the Date of this Return					
法定股本 Authorized Share Capital		已發行股本 Issued Share Capital			
股份類別 Class of Shares	總面值 Total Nominal Value †	已發行 股份數目 Number of Shares Issued (a)	每股已 發行股份 的面值 Nominal Value of Each Share Issued † (b)	已發行股份的 總面值 Total Nominal Value of Shares Issued † (a) x (b)	已發行股份的 已繳股款總值 (不包括溢價) Total Paid up Value of Shares Issued † (excluding premium)
Ordinary	HK\$10,000.00	2	HK\$1.00	HK\$2.00	HK\$2.00
總值 Total	HK\$10,000.00	2		HK\$2.00	HK\$2.00

† 請註明貨幣單位(例如：港元、美元)
Please specify the currency (e.g. HKD, USD)



(註Note 13) 10 有股本公司的成員詳情 **Details of Member(s) of a Company Having a Share Capital**
(如未能盡錄於下列表格內，請用續頁A填報 Use Continuation Sheet A if there is insufficient space)


截至本申報表日期的成員詳情 Details of Member(s) as at the Date of this Return

股份類別 Class of Shares

Ordinary

如公司的股份自上一份周年申報表日期以來(如屬首份周年申報表，則自公司成立為法團以來)有任何轉讓，有關詳情亦請一併填報；股份受讓人的姓名/名稱請在「備註」一欄註明。
If there have been any transfers of the company's shares since the date of the last Annual Return (or since incorporation if this is the first Annual Return), please also provide details of the transfers; the name of the transferee should be stated in the 'Remarks' column.

姓名 / 名稱 Name	地址 Address	股份 Shares		備註 Remarks	
		現時持有量 Current Holding	轉讓 Transferred		
			數目 Number		日期 Date
Orient Investments Limited	The Hallmark Building, Suite 227 Old Airport Road, The Valley, Anguilla, British West Indies	1			
Pacific Investments Limited	The Hallmark Building, Suite 227 Old Airport Road, The Valley, Anguilla, British West Indies	1			
總數 Total		2			



11 秘書 Secretary

A. 個人秘書 Individual Secretary

(如超過一名個人秘書，請用續頁B填報 Use Continuation Sheet B if more than 1 individual secretary)

中文姓名
Name in Chinese

英文姓名
Name in English

姓氏 Surname

名字 Other Names

前用姓名
Previous Names

別名
Alias

(註 Note 14)

香港住址
Hong Kong Residential Address

(註 Note 15)

電郵地址
E-mail Address

(註 Note 16)

身份證明 Identification

a 香港身份證號碼
Hong Kong Identity Card Number

b 海外護照
Overseas Passport

簽發國家 Issuing Country

號碼 Number

B. 法人團體秘書 Corporate Secretary

(如超過一名法人團體秘書，請用續頁B填報 Use Continuation Sheet B if more than 1 corporate secretary)

(註 Note 17)

中文名稱
Name in Chinese

(Nil)

(註 Note 17)

英文名稱
Name in English

ICS Secretaries Limited

(註 Note 18)

香港地址
Hong Kong Address

8th Floor Henley Building 5 Queen's Road Central Hong Kong

(註 Note 15)

電郵地址
E-mail Address


(Nil)

公司編號 Company Number

(只適用於在香港註冊的法人團體)

(Only applicable to body corporate registered in Hong Kong)

189973



788462

12 董事 Director

A. 個人董事 Individual Director

(如超過兩名個人董事，請用續頁C填報 Use Continuation Sheet C if more than 2 individual directors)

(註 Note 19)

1 身份
Capacity

董事
Director

候補董事
Alternate Director

代替 Alternate to

Empty box for alternate name

中文姓名
Name in Chinese

Empty box for Chinese name

英文姓名
Name in English

Empty box for English name, split into Surname and Other Names

姓氏 Surname

名字 Other Names

前用姓名
Previous Names

Empty box for previous names

別名
Alias

Empty box for alias

(註 Note 20)

住址
Residential Address

Empty box for residential address, split into address and country

國家 Country

(註 Note 21)

電郵地址
E-mail Address

Empty box for e-mail address

(註 Note 22)

身份證明 Identification

a 香港身份證號碼
Hong Kong Identity Card Number

Empty box for Hong Kong Identity Card Number

b 海外護照
Overseas Passport


Empty box for overseas passport

簽發國家 Issuing Country

號碼 Number

PUBLIC

第五頁 Page 5



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788462

12 董事 Director (續上頁 cont'd)

(註 Note 19)

2 身份
Capacity

董事
Director

候補董事
Alternate Director

代替 Alternate to

中文姓名
Name in Chinese

英文姓名
Name in English

姓氏 Surname

名字 Other Names

前用姓名
Previous Names

別名
Alias

(註 Note 20)

住址
Residential Address

國家 Country

(註 Note 21)

電郵地址
E-mail Address

(註 Note 22)


身份證明 Identification

a 香港身份證號碼
Hong Kong Identity Card Number

b 海外護照
Overseas Passport

簽發國家 Issuing Country

號碼 Number



788462

12 董事 Director (續上頁 cont'd)

B. 法人團體董事 Corporate Director

(如超過兩名法人團體董事，請用續頁D填報 Use Continuation Sheet D if more than 2 corporate directors)

(註 Note 19)

1 身份 Capacity 董事 Director 候補董事 Alternate Director

代替 Alternate to
N/A

中文名稱 Name in Chinese (Nil)

英文名稱 Name in English Orient Investments Limited

(註 Note 23)

地址 Address
The Hallmark Building, Suite 227 Old Airport Road,
The Valley, British West Indies
Anguilla
國家 Country

(註 Note 21)

電郵地址 E-mail Address (Nil)

公司編號 Company Number (只適用於在香港註冊的法人團體)
(Only applicable to body corporate registered in Hong Kong)
N/A

(註 Note 19)

2 身份 Capacity 董事 Director 候補董事 Alternate Director

代替 Alternate to
N/A

中文名稱 Name in Chinese (Nil)

英文名稱 Name in English Pacific Investments Limited


(註 Note 23)

地址 Address
The Hallmark Building, Suite 227 Old Airport Road,
The Valley, British West Indies
Anguilla
國家 Country

(註 Note 21)

電郵地址 E-mail Address (Nil)

公司編號 Company Number (只適用於在香港註冊的法人團體)
(Only applicable to body corporate registered in Hong Kong)



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12 董事 Director (續上頁 cont'd)

C. 備任董事 Reserve Director

(只適用於只有一名成員而該成員同時亦是唯一董事的私人公司 Only applicable to a private company with only one member who is also the sole director of the company)

中文姓名
Name in Chinese

英文姓名
Name in English

--	--

姓氏 Surname

名字 Other Names

曾用姓名
Previous Names

別名
Alias

(註 Note 20)

住址
Residential Address

--	--

國家 Country

(註 Note 21)

電郵地址
E-mail Address

(註 Note 22)

身份證明 Identification


a 香港身份證號碼
Hong Kong Identity Card Number

b 海外護照
Overseas Passport

--	--

簽發國家 Issuing Country

號碼 Number



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13 登記冊 Registers

公司備存下列登記冊的地址 (如並非備存於第5項的註冊辦事處內)
Address where the following registers of the company are kept (if not kept at the Registered Office in Section 5)

登記冊 Register	地址 Address
a 成員登記冊 Register of Members	N/A
b 債權證持有人登記冊 (如有的話) Register of Debenture Holders (if any)	N/A

(註 Note 24) **14 隨表提交的帳目所涵蓋的會計結算始末日期**
Period Covered by Accounts Submitted with this Form
(私人公司毋須填報此項 A private company need not complete this section)

			至			
HDD	HMM	年YYYY	To	HDD	HMM	年YYYY

15 證明書 Certificate

(此項證明只適用於私人公司。如不適用，請刪去此項。)
(This Certificate should only be completed in respect of a private company. If not applicable, please delete.)

本人證明公司自上一份周年申報表日期以來(如屬首份周年申報表，則自成立為法團以來)，並無發出任何文件，邀請公眾人士認購公司任何股份或債權證；同時如成員數目於本申報表日期超過五十，則所超出的成員，全是根據《公司條例》第29(1)(b)條不須計算入該五十名額內的人士。
I certify that the company has not, since the date of the last Annual Return (or since incorporation if this is the first Annual Return), issued any invitation to the public to subscribe for any shares or debentures in the company and that if the number of members is in excess of 50 as at the Date of this Return, the excess are persons who under section 29(1)(b) of the Companies Ordinance are not to be included in the calculation of 50.

本申報表包括 _____ 張續頁 A、 _____ 張續頁 B、 _____ 張續頁 C 及 _____ 張續頁 D。
This Return includes _____ (Nil) Continuation Sheet(s) A, _____ (Nil) Continuation Sheet(s) B, _____ (Nil) Continuation Sheet(s) C and _____ (Nil) Continuation Sheet(s) D.

For and on behalf of
ICS SECRETARIES LIMITED

簽署 Signed :

姓名 Name : ICS Secretaries Limited 日期 Date : 08/03/2006
董事 Director / 秘書 Secretary * HDD / HMM / 年YYYY

* 請刪去不適用者 Delete whichever does not apply

指明編號 2/2004 (修訂) (2004年2月)
Specification No. 2/2004 (Revision) (Feb. 2004)

