War in the treasury of the people

Instead, as a two-year investigation reveals, they are a major source of conflict and grievance, supply millions of dollars of funding to armed groups, insurgents, and strongmen, and provide a tiny fraction of the benefit they should to the Afghan people. Without a coherent response, these mines – and others like them across Afghanistan – represent not just a lost opportunity, but a threat to the whole country.

The direct rivals in the violent competition for Badakhshan’s ancient lapis lazuli mines are two local strongmen. Both have exploited the mines, both have links to national politics, and both allegedly have had back-door ties to the Taliban. According to rough but plausible estimates, the revenue going to these strongmen and the Taliban from just one small area of Badakhshan rivals the government’s declared income from the entire Afghan natural resources sector. For now, the lapis which supplies much of the world market is, by any reasonable definition, a conflict mineral.

This struggle is one of resources, not ideology: a “business war.” But it has nonetheless created the conditions in which the Taliban – who have a close relationship with the local affiliate of the Islamic State – threaten to take the mines, and already control the much of their revenue. And it is a major reason why a province which resisted the Taliban at the height of their power is now one of their strongholds. Amid the conflict and lawlessness around the mines, it is the insurgency that has benefitted above all.

Badakhshan illustrates wider dangers around Afghanistan’s natural resources. Mining is implicated in violence from Balkh to Helmand. Nationally, it is thought to be the Taliban’s second largest source of revenue, while contributing less than 1% of state income in 2013. Afghanistan’s estimated $1trn of mineral reserves could in theory generate $2bn revenue a year: hopes for the country’s economic growth, and by extension its independence from foreign aid, rely on their development. But they threaten to do the opposite – to be a chronic source of conflict and corruption, while generating little revenue. Improving the governance of the whole sector is not just a matter of legality or of morality: it is of fundamental importance to the future of the country.

That urgency has not so far been adequately reflected in the policy of either the Afghan government or its partners– despite some distinctly encouraging recent announcements. They should make it a first-order priority, first by increasing accountability, transparency, and local engagement around mining (notably in the mining law), and by prioritising security in mining areas. Badakhshan, where both the scale of the threat and the potential reward are disproportionately high, is worth particular attention – but reform is needed for the whole country. With some basic safeguards yet to be implemented, effective action is possible.

A former commander with the Jamiat e Islami political and military faction, Abdul Malek was part of the National Front which held Badakhshan during the civil war of the 1990's and for much of the preceding period of jihad against the communist government and its Soviet backers. As the military commander for the Kuran wa Munjan district before 2001, Malek had direct control of the lapis mines. After 2001, he retained significant local influence, transitioning to become the Chief of Police of Kuran wa Munjan, a position he held until late 2012. He was transferred elsewhere but returned to lead an armed takeover of the district in January 2014.

Zulmai Mujadidi was born in 1958 to a prominent local elder in Jurm district of Badakhshan. He reportedly holds a bachelor degree in geology from Kabul University. another former Jamiat e Islami commander who joined the fight against the Soviet-backed government, Mujadidi rose to head the 10th directorate of the National Directorate of Security (NDS), which dealt with protection of high-ranking officials – including, after 2001, the new Afghan president, Hamid Karzai. Mujadidi developed a close relationship with Karzai, shifting his allegiance from his former mentor, the Jamiat leader Burhanuddin Rabbani. He became an AMP in the 2005 elections, and was seen as Karzai’s virtual ‘shadow viceroy’ in Badakhshan, supported as a counter-weight to Rabbani and other alternative centres of power.

Brother to Zulmai Mujadidi, Asadullah was appointed in 2007 as the head of the paramilitary security force for the lapis mines, the Mining Protection Force (MPF), reportedly through the influence of his brother. Officially, the MPF has jurisdiction only over the Kuran wa Munjan district where the lapis mines are found, but Asadullah and his men have also operated in the Deodarra region, where tourmaline is mined.

Son of Barat Muhammad Sawda, Muhammad was born in 1971 in Faizabad, the capital of Badakhshan. He was schooled in Pakistan and in Jurm district and obtained a Bachelor’s degree in Law and Political Science at Kabul University. Sawda is an MP and former minerals trader and businessman who was elected to Parliament's lower house in 2010. He is the chair of the Natural Resources and the Environment Commission, which deals with mining – a position that would represent a particular conflict of interest if he were shown to have a stake in mining himself.

Zekria Sawda and Asadullah Mujadidi both deny involvement in mining in Badakhshan, or with illicit armed groups. Zulmai Mujadidi also strongly denied the allegations, saying that the “sources of [this] information are not objective, but rather have originated from or influenced by my political opponents and foes; the issues raised are nothing more than propaganda.” He supplied a copy of a summary decision of the Afghan Media Complaints Commission against a media outlet which made similar allegations. General Mohammadi did not comment, while Commander Malek could not be reached to request his views, although in public statements he has denied that the lapis mines profit the Taliban or that extensive illegal mining takes place.

Many of the concerns set out above are relevant across Afghanistan,where there are thousands of illegal mines outside of government control. Direct comparisons can be misleading, but there is a clear risk Afghanistan could see a prolonged, resource-fuelled conflict of the kind that has been so damaging elsewhere. The specific problems around mining are closely linked to deeper challenges of conflict, corruption, and the weakness of Afghan state institutions. But that does not mean action is futile: there are a range of practical policy measures that could reduce the risks associated with extractives, without placing unrealistic demands on government capacity.

But while this provides a foundation for reform, for now the government has yet to put in place a number of basic protections – notably to strengthen the Mining Law, publish mining data, reinforce oversight capacity, and support community monitoring of mining. Illegal extraction remains widespread, with little or no accountability for the powerful figures involved, and large-scale smuggling of lapis through the Panjshir valley continues. For their part, donors have spent many millions promoting mining, but with a few honourable exceptions have focused on overcoming obstacles to new contracts more than on the fundamental governance challenges, which at this stage pose a much greater threat.

The government faces great challenges, and cannot realistically regain control of the thousands of illegally exploited mines in Afghanistan overnight. The question is whether the problems around mining are given a level of priority that reflects their importance – and whether the government is doing the things that are relatively easy, like reforming the mining law. If there is the will to act, a sustained reform of the sector could generate millions of dollars in revenue, improve the lives of ordinary Afghans, and help lay the foundations for lasting stability. In the battle for Afghanistan’s future, mining is not a bad place to start.