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cover
1. recommendations
2. introduction
3. the case for positive conditionality & international responsibility
4. the forest policy reform project & the steering committee
5. transparency
6. forest yield & revenue potential
7. concession activity and review
8. dfw–enforcement & jurisdiction
9. situation update–general
special military region
military region 1
military region 2
military region 3
military region 4
military region 5
10. the role of cambodia’s neighbours & other importing countries
thailand
laos
vietnam
japan
11. opportunities
the forest stewardship council (fsc)
protected areas and world heritage status
12. conclusion
Due to military threat and shortcomings within departmental and legal systems, the DFW lacks power to effectively enforce forestry legislation.
In many provinces committed provincial forestry officials have received such severe intimidation from the military that they dare not oppose illegal activities. In others corrupt forestry officials have built up personal fiefdoms and considerable wealth by ‘taxing’ rather than preventing illegal logging activities. The DFW in Phnom Penh cannot penalise these officials, this being the responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture. Consequently the forestry chiefs in, for example, Kompong Thom and Ratanakiri loot the forests with impunity and have done for years.
Prosecution of concessionaires acting illegally is thwarted by a slow judicial process, which in many cases, will not proceed against a given concessionaire, because for example, they deny ownership of illegally felled logs even if they have their name and tags on them, or because the company has high level political and/or military connections. Thus confiscation of logs and logging equipment remains the DFW’s only potent weapon, and even this is used selectively and on a minor scale.
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