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cover
1. recommendations
2. introduction
3. the case for positive conditionality & international responsibility
4. the forest policy reform project & the steering committee
5. transparency
6. forest yield & revenue potential
7. concession activity and review
8. dfw–enforcement & jurisdiction
9. situation update–general
special military region
military region 1
military region 2
military region 3
military region 4
military region 5
10. the role of cambodia’s neighbours & other importing countries
thailand
laos
vietnam
japan
11. opportunities
the forest stewardship council (fsc)
protected areas and world heritage status
12. conclusion
In Global Witness’ 1996 CG document, RGC Forest Policy & Practice: The Case for Positive Conditionality, it was argued that the international donors apply positive conditionality when determining future aid disbursements to Cambodia. Both before and during the 1996 and 1997 CG meetings, major improvements and strong statements of intent were readily forthcoming, only to be abandoned once the meeting had taken place. In late 1996, inaction by the RGC led directly to the lapsing of the IMF’s next ESAF loan tranche and in 1997 the July Coup d’état ended the prospect of positive improvements by the government.
The 1999 CG and the Case for Positive Conditionality
It is clear that such past practices have effectively meant that potential donor/government interaction to improve the forestry sector is confined to an annual brief period of hope. Given the scale of the onslaught against Cambodia’s forests and the potential for Cambodia’s forests to become commercially destroyed within the next five years, Cambodia cannot afford another year of inaction. For these reasons, it is imperative that the international donor community apply strong positive, performance-related conditions to certain sectors of donor assistance during the 1999 CG process. Clearly, different donors may need to apply different approaches to conditionality, but some, especially major donors such as the EU may already be able to play a crucial role through the potential for its "suspension clause" (relevant to all its aid programmes) to be invoked.
Whilst appropriate international donor support is urgently required, the provision of aid with no strings attached has led to a belief in the RGC that regardless of what happens; international support will continue, thus removing any incentive for improvement. But this year Global Witness believes this approach will be a missed opportunity and could lead to a return to the RGC inaction of 1996. Similarly, complete disengagement (such as the IMF’s 1996 decision) will lead to an increase in logging and a further assault on Cambodia’s forests.
It is clear that the only way forward is for the international donors to provide tranched aid disbursements with release of non-humanitarian funds tied to performance. Performance should be judged on the basis of regular government/donor update meetings, which should occur at least monthly. Such meetings could be hosted by the DFW, which should report to both the government and donors about the status of forestry in each province; with reports providing details including the status of concessions, actions taken against illegally operating concessionaires, actions taken against military units involved in logging (especially their commanding officers), the status of national parks, details of illegal exports, etc. It is crucial that such a strategy be considered by both the Government and donors as an opportunity for positive cooperation.
Such a reporting process should be backed up with information and evidence provided by independent monitors, financed by the donors and operating with high level authority to monitor all logging activities, in all provinces, and especially on the frontiers and at access points to the sea.
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