home
cover
1. recommendations
2. introduction
3. the case for positive conditionality & international responsibility
4. the forest policy reform project & the steering committee
5. transparency
6. forest yield & revenue potential
7. concession activity and review
8. dfw–enforcement & jurisdiction
9. situation update–general
special military region
military region 1
military region 2
military region 3
military region 4
military region 5
10. the role of cambodia’s neighbours & other importing countries
thailand
laos
vietnam
japan
11. opportunities
the forest stewardship council (fsc)
protected areas and world heritage status
12. conclusion
THIS DOCUMENT is intended to present a brief analysis of the current situation within Cambodia’s forestry sector, and a round up of information obtained during Global Witness’ investigations in nine key provinces in December 1998 and January 1999. The space limitations of this document mean that the information presented is far from exhaustive. A full report will be published in April/May 1999.
The 1999 meeting of the Consultative Group (CG) represents an historic opportunity for the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC), in partnership with the international community, to leave the past few years of unprecedented forest destruction behind. Cambodia still possesses large tracts of commercially valuable forest and areas of rich biodiversity which at the current rate of exploitation will be exhausted by 2003, but which can equally be preserved for the future benefit of Cambodia and its people if strong action is taken immediately.
The fact that Hun Sen put his personal authority behind the 6th January 1999 crackdown and has made other statements to the same effect gives some cause for optimism. As the country’s sole Prime Minister any failure to live up to his pledges will be seen as a personal failure both domestically and internationally, undoubtedly with political and economic consequences. Conversely, effective reform of the forestry sector will bring Hun Sen respect and credibility.
The real significance of this crackdown is that, as far as timber exports are concerned, it has largely worked; in addition it is the first time in the past four years that any of the RGC’s forestry commitments have been translated into concrete action. This shows that Hun Sen’s political will is still powerful enough to influence an increasingly autonomous trade, and is crucial to solve the issue of illegal logging.
However, the RGC traditionally tries to impress the bilateral and multilateral donors before CG meetings and largely fails to adhere to its pledges. For this reason it is incumbent on the donors to ensure that 1999 is the year that the RGC lives up to its obligations. The international community has helped ensure that forestry is one of the central issues in Cambodia’s reconstruction. The IMF’s statement at the 1997 CG in Paris that "forestry is the single most critical issue facing Cambodia" is truer today, given the vast acceleration in illegal logging between July 1997 and December 1998. The donors strong statements about illegal logging at the 1996 and 1997 CG meetings did give rise to the World Bank funded Technical Assistance (TA) projects (The Forest Policy Reform Project) but failed to have any effect on illegal logging or the awarding of concessions.
For these reasons Global Witness believes it is imperative that the donors impose positive conditionality on non-humanitarian aid, geared to performance related developments in the forestry sector, ie the release of aid in tranches. This will require a regular reporting process by the RGC, backed by an independent monitoring process, which will ideally need to be up and running within two months of the CG.
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